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Introduction
When was “the postcolonial”? This apparently simple question contains a number
of difficulties relating to concepts, epistemology, and temporality (Hall 1996). These
problems emerge from the fact that systems of colonization inscribe their marks so
deeply upon the societies of both the colonized and the colonizers that they cannot
simply be eradicated by the political act of declaring independence. Even after inde-
pendence, such societies remain heavily under the influence of the “gravity,” to use
Edward Said’s term, of colonial history (1994, 367). Arguably, decolonization begins
before independence with freedom struggles against colonial hegemony and domi-
nation. And, it certainly continues after colonization has formally ended, as much
time is needed to free social institutions and discourses from often subtle kinds of
determination by the colonizing power—if that can ever be achieved. There is no
simple dichotomy of the colonial and the postcolonial. Problems of periodization
proliferate if “postcolonial” is taken to label a global process of transition. Yet when
we take dates of independence not as “definite” but as “decisive” points of transition
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(Frankenberg and Mani 1993), the difficulty can be reduced by narrowing the scope
to specific colonized areas. It seems reasonable to argue that this decisive date for India
and Pakistan was August 14 or 15, 1947.
The high mountain region today called the Northern Areas of Pakistan, which
will be discussed in this article, is an example of the complexity of this problem. The
British left the former Gilgit Agency (as this region was called in colonial times), a
peripheral but nonetheless strategically important part of colonial India, on July 31,
1947, two weeks before independence. The area thus began a process of transition
that, as is argued from recent nationalist perspectives, even today has not reached a
stage of decolonization in a meaningful sense.
The deconstructive analysis of postcolonial studies has shown that colonialism
did not operate through a simple dichotomy of colonizers versus colonized, but was
subverted by ambivalence and continually had to be reconstructed (Prakash 1992,
169). Colonialism was not simply a matter of the West versus the non-West. This
certainly holds true for the Northern Areas of Pakistan. Here the dichotomy became
blurred by intertwining histories of domination: until 1947 the area was subjected
to British rule and then simultaneous domination by Britain and Jammu and Kash-
mir.
Although independence is celebrated in India and Pakistan every year on August
15, the then Gilgit Agency was freed from British control two weeks earlier. On that
day, the Gilgit Agency became part of neither India nor Pakistan, but rather was
“given back” to the control of Kashmir. In Gilgit, that day was not so much an event
of joyful celebration as it was of uncertain consideration as to what the future would
bring. The people of Gilgit have their own freedom day (yo¯m-e a¯za¯dı¯), which is com-
memorated on November 1, the date when the people of Gilgit started their own
freedom struggle (jang a¯za¯dı¯)—not against the British, but against the rule of the
maharaja of Kashmir. The struggle’s aim was to merge the Gilgit Agency with the
newly born Muslim state of Pakistan. Until today, however, the (now) Northern Areas
have never been a legal part of that country. It is just “under the administration of
the Government of Pakistan.” Several times in the last few years, the celebration
of yo¯m-e a¯za¯dı¯ on November 1 has been boycotted by local oppositional groups that
perceive the present Pakistani administration not as constituting a “rule of freedom,”
but as a new colonial system.
According to the perspective of these groups, Gilgit and the surrounding moun-
tain country have been subjected to three different powers in the last 150 years:
Kashmiri,1 British, and Pakistani. Instead of locating a uni- or multilinear transition
from colonialism to the postcolonial, we discover only transitions between specific
relations and modes of domination and subalternity in the history of the Northern
Areas. We can find decisive differences in the relations between the dominating power
and the subaltern local population: fierce opposition and at times incidents of insur-
rection against both Kashmiri and Pakistani rule but much less against the British.
What is the reason for this difference? That question is the topic of this article. To
prevent any misunderstanding, I emphasize from the beginning that I am not at all
interested in the continuation or restoration of an image of benevolent and just rule
that the British liked to present of themselves.
1Although technically speaking the area was not ruled by the Kashmiris, but by Dogras
(and earlier by Sikhs) who ruled over Jammu and Kashmir State, I will for reasons of conven-
ience employ the shorthand of “Kashmiri rule” throughout the article—as does most of the
literature on the history of this region.
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My exploration started with anthropological fieldwork between 1991 and 1993
on ethnicity in Gilgit.2 During this time, I realized that I had to deal not only with
diverse forms of local “ethnic” identities but also with the political conditions in the
aftermath of British colonization and the Kashmir dispute that gave rise to a new,
inclusive political identity. A nation of the Northern Areas was in the process of being
imagined. As a result, my field research—later supplemented by archival research in
London—became to a considerable extent focused on this political development. The
“freedom struggle”—that is, the struggle against domination and an administration
considered alien—was a central motif in the stories and histories that I was told in
Gilgit. In this article, I want to discuss the different modes of domination in the
history of what is today the Northern Areas of Pakistan. The article focuses on the
western part of the Northern Areas, comprising the erstwhile Gilgit Agency, and
especially on the town of Gilgit.3
After starting with a discussion of Michel Foucault’s and Ranajit Guha’s concep-
tions of power and domination that enable the distinction between different modes
of domination according to the degree to which they rely on violence or consensus, I
will explore the different discourses of legitimation of Kashmiri and British rule in
Gilgit as they emerged from British sources. I dwell especially on British strategies
to develop a “practical” hegemony and analyze the role of the Gilgit Scouts for this
purpose. In a section on protest and resistance in the Gilgit Agency, I show that this
hegemony remained, however, only partial and never extended to all sections of the
population. The British self-perception of their domination becomes especially visible
on the eve of their leaving the agency in 1947. During the term of a Kashmiri
governor, lasting from August 1, 1947, until the end of October, which I explore
subsequently, Kashmiri rule was again unable to achieve a degree of acceptance and
consensus in Gilgit. In the section on the Northern Areas under Pakistani adminis-
tration, I point out that the initial legitimacy of Pakistani rule was increasingly lost
and was then replaced in part by violent resistance, resulting finally in political move-
ments in which autonomy and independence were demanded. Pakistani and British
modes of domination are compared in the last part of this section. Finally, I discuss
relations between power and knowledge in the Northern Areas and the possibility of
writing nonessentialist histories under the polarizing conditions of power.
Modes of Domination: Relations of Force
and Relations of Power
As in other parts of the colonized world, for both general and specific reasons, in
Gilgit there was no simple dichotomous opposition of power between colonizers and
the colonized, or, put more generally, between dominators and the dominated, be-
tween rulers and the ruled. The general reason emerges from the nature of power
itself. Power is one of the most complex concepts in the social sciences, with definitions
and understandings, at times quite contradictory, abounding.4 The debate on power
2My fieldwork was divided into two terms. In total I stayed fifteen months in the Northern
Areas.
3Baltistan and the adjacent valleys toward the east share the current political condition
with Gilgit but have a very different historical trajectory. Therefore, these areas are not con-
sidered here.
4For a recent discussion from an anthropological perspective on power, see Westwood
2002.
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has been strongly influenced by Michel Foucault, who emphasizes the ubiquity of
power: power is not only vested in political entities such as the state and its institu-
tions or in collective subjects such as classes but also dispersed in political and social
relations or networks (1979b, 55). He describes power as a “more-or-less coordinated
(in the event, no doubt, ill-coordinated) cluster of relations. . .” (1980, 199). A sig-
nificant element in his thought is the idea that power depends on the agency of both
the one who commands and the one who obeys or follows (1982, 219–22). The power
of the ruler is not aimed at the negation of the agency of those ruled, but at the
manipulation of their actions in order to achieve certain goals. Both the dominant
and the subaltern possess power and are affected by it—if of course in highly unequal
measure. Power is an element of all social relations (Touraine 1981, 33)—not only of
those of domination—and there is no social action without power. In this article,
however, the discussion is limited to relations of power in the context of government
and administration.
The broad conceptualization of power employed here requires a clear distinction
between power and force or violence. Force/violence does not recognize the agency of
the individual subjected to force. According to Foucault’s distinction, the target of
force is not the action, but the body of the dominated. Force/violence establishes an
almost causal relationship between dominators and the dominated. Under the pressure
of violence, one has no choice but to comply. Ultimately violence risks destroying
power: it threatens the physical elimination of subalterns. Once subalterns are re-
moved, there is no one left to comply with the power, and the relationship on which
power is based disappears. Consequently, the dominators no longer have power. There-
fore, the relations between dominator and subaltern cannot be permanently based
solely on violence. Relations of violence and force have to be turned into relations of
power in order to maintain stable and enduring structures of domination. In accor-
dance with Hannah Arendt (1970), I regard the distinction between violence and
power as crucial for understanding different modes of domination. This is different
from Ranajit Guha’s concept of the “configuration of power” (1997, 20), in which
power encompasses coercion/violence and which therefore cannot explain why the
execution of violence in the end destroys power.
Guha’s model is probably the most influential theorization of power and domi-
nation within the field of South Asian studies. It must be read within the frame of
the efforts of the Subaltern Studies group to question radically both the elitist bias of
Indian historiography and the Eurocentrism of a Western history of India that en-
deavors to present the colonization of the subcontinent as an almost necessary chain
of events which raised India from a stage of the prepolitical to the level of the truly
political.
Both approaches tend to monopolize power and the ability to act politically in
the hands of colonizers and/or the (Westernized) nationalist elite (Guha 1982; see also
Chakrabarty 2000). To show that neither the British colonialists nor the Indian bour-
geoisie achieved a degree of hegemony that allowed for a claim of acting on behalf
and with the consent of “the Indian people,” Guha rightly emphasizes the coercive
nature of the colonial regime. He theorizes power as the relation of domination and
subordination in which domination is characterized by coercion and persuasion and
subordination is characterized by collaboration and resistance—both to varying de-
grees. The colonial regime is then defined by a power structure in which persuasion
never outweighs resistance and in which hegemony—defined in these terms—accord-
ingly is never achieved (Guha 1997, 20–23). The autonomy of subaltern agency,
expressed in acts of resistance, is thus emphasized.
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My issue with Guha’s model is slight. I do not intend to question the overall
nonhegemonic character of colonial rule in India, but I will argue that the modes of
domination on which colonialism relied changed according to the extent to which
these modes resorted to power or violence. Furthermore, I am of the opinion that
questions of consensus, legitimacy, or hegemony cannot be answered on a very general
level. The colonial regime acted quite differentially toward the various sectors of the
population and was in turn evaluated very differently by these sectors. In his inter-
pretation of colonial relations, Guha relies most importantly on the distinction be-
tween the Indian bourgeoisie and the subalterns or “the people.” I regard this dis-
tinction as too gross for the area discussed in this article. Apart from the fact that it
is quite futile to attempt to discover a bourgeoisie in the erstwhile Gilgit Agency,
the subalterns were composed of many different elements not affected by the colonial
regime in a uniform manner.
Theoretically force/violence and power can be distinguished quite clearly, but in
practice making that distinction is much more difficult. Relations of power are
founded upon possible structures of violence.5 At its limits, power is either given up
to or turns to violence. Power always coexists with at least the option for violence.
Colonial relations, then, cannot be built only upon power; colonial power has to be
backed by force. At the other limit of power is consensus or “persuasion,” in Guha’s
term (1997). When consensus is achieved completely, power becomes unnecessary.
Consensus, expressed in the legitimacy of a given power, reduces the friction of power
relations. When a high degree of legitimacy is obtained, power achieves its aims
smoothly. Toward the other end of the spectrum, when consensus is replaced by the
threat or actual application of violence, friction increases and turns into resistance.
The powers of dominant and subaltern become antagonistic. With the threat of vio-
lence, the dominant power can try to reduce the power of the subalterns—but it may
produce even more resistance. To avoid that friction, systems of domination must aim
at establishing their own legitimacy, at building hegemony. Legitimacy may be
achieved to a certain extent at one point in time and may utterly fail at another.
Accordingly, modes of domination can be distinguished according to the degree to
which they rely on legitimacy or violence. Modes of domination are contingent upon
changes in historical context and conditions.
The second reason for the nondichotomy of colonial relations is that the field of
domination comprising both colonizers and the colonized was inhabited by a number
of intermediate relationships of domination. Relations of power are not only found
between colonizers and the colonized but also in all other social relations anchored in
or effective on a given locality. Relations between local elites or ruling families and
their subjects, between different kinds of social groups, or within families, gender
relations, and so on, are all marked by certain relations of power and/or violence that
affect each other and are not independent of colonial relations. Like power, subalternity
is a matter of degree. The subalternity of an actor in one instance does not preclude
his (or, in the present context less frequently, her) domination in another.
Against this outline of a theory of power and violence, I want to analyze colonial
relations in the Gilgit Agency. I understand colonial relations in a rather broad sense
that accommodates not only British domination but also all kinds of domination
perceived locally—that is, by those colonized—as “foreign.” By employing the term
5Arendt’s distinction between power and violence is even more radical than that of Fou-
cault. For her, power is solely founded upon consensus, but power that totally abstains from
violence is more a liberal ideal or fiction than a political experience (1986, 71).
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Table. Changes of government in Gilgit
ca. 1842 First occupation of Gilgit by troops from Kashmir
1846 Conquest of Gilgit by Raja Goharaman from Yasin
1860 Death of Goharaman, reestablishment of Kashmiri domination in
Gilgit
1879–81 Establishment of the first British Agency in Gilgit by Colonel
Biddulph, parallel with Kashmiri administration
1889 Reestablishment of the British Gilgit Agency, period of “dual
control” by the Kashmiri and British
1935 Lease of the Gilgit Agency by the British, end of dual control
July 30, 1947 Transfer of the administration of Gilgit from the British to
Governor Ghansara Singh from Kashmir
November 1, 1947 Insurgence against Kashmir, establishment of “Islamic Republic of
Gilgit”
November 16, 1947– Establishment of Pakistani administration
“colonial” equally for Western and non-Western powers, I avoid the recentering of
“postcolonial discourse” on a dominant Western perspective that is inevitable if “co-
lonial” remains reserved for European powers (see McClintock 1992, 86). The colonial
character of a given relation of domination becomes, then, a matter of both a structure
of institutions and practices as well as signification. The same relations and practices
may be accorded different signification in different times or by different persons from
different perspectives and positions at the same time, depending on the degree to
which consensus and the legitimacy of those dominating are achieved. I will argue in
particular that the Pakistani domination of the Northern Areas had considerable le-
gitimacy in and after 1947 but that later certain actors signified it as a colonial regime.
Discourses of Legitimacy on the
“Northern Frontier”
That there were two colonial powers in the area, Kashmiri and British, governing
with different though not always clearly delimited competences and competing in
many respects determined to a large extent colonial relations in Gilgit until 1947 (see
table). This rivalry was a competition not only for actual political control over the
area and its people but also for the legitimacy of that control. Legitimacy is required
to turn domination by force into domination by power. In this section, I will focus
on the analysis of this discourse of legitimacy. My sources for these discourses are very
limited, as they consist of the writings of British officers only. Still, in these texts,
we can clearly discern the development of a separation between British and Kashmiri
legitimacy. This legitimacy concerned mostly the self-legitimation of rule and much
less the acceptance of that legitimacy by those ruled—hegemony is thus out of ques-
tion. We find, however, that by distancing their rule from Kashmiri rule—that is,
by achieving a legitimacy that consisted also of questioning the legitimacy of Kash-
miri rule—the British were able to achieve a degree of consensus from a part of those
whom they dominated. The British documents do not allow for access to the “hidden
transcripts” (Scott 1990) of the colonial subjects who did not share in this consensus.
Between the lines, and sometimes quite explicitly, however, expressions of discontent
and movements of resistance can also be read.
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Map. The Northern Areas of Pakistan.
Troops from Kashmir established their control in Gilgit for the first time around
1842. At that time, Kashmir was a province of the empire of the Sikh Maharaja Ranjit
Singh. For two or three decades prior, Gilgit had been under the control of rulers who
too were not “at home” in Gilgit but had invaded the place from neighboring valleys
such as Yasin (Suleman Shah and Gohar Aman), Punial (Azad Khan), and Nager
(Tahir Shah). The domination established by these rulers could be regarded as “co-
lonial”: some sources describe local resistance at least against the rajas of Punial and
Yasin, who were accordingly regarded as foreign usurpers of rajaship in Gilgit (see,
for example, Shah Rais Khan 1987). Legitimacy of rule was at that time mostly
conceived in terms of dynastic legitimacy; that is, it was more a matter of relations
among the dominant than of relations between rulers and the ruled (see, for example,
Shah Rais Khan 1987, 346; Biddulph 1880/1971, 138).
After defeating Maharaja Ranjit Singh in the Punjab, the British made over
Kashmir by the famous Treaty of Amritsar (1846) to the Dogra Raja Gulab Singh of
Jammu, who thus became maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir. Gulab Singh’s actual
takeover of Kashmir had to be aided militarily by the British due to much resistance
to the new ruler. By assuming power in Kashmir, Gulab Singh also became successor
of the Sikhs in Gilgit, even though Gilgit was formally excluded in the Treaty of
Amritsar, which ceded only the territories east of the Indus to Gulab Singh. Gilgit
is situated northwest of the river (see map). Nevertheless, Frederic Drew, an English-
man who served Gulab Singh’s son Ranbir Singh in a range of important positions,
tried to legitimate the claim of the Dogras to control Gilgit. According to him, the
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geographical specification of the Treaty of Amritsar was simply due to a lack of
appropriate knowledge, not to the explicit intention to exclude Gilgit from the ter-
ritory sold to Gulab Singh (1875/1980, 439–40). Drew simultaneously tried to rule
out other contestants of possession of Gilgit, namely, the regional rajas. His first
strategy referred to the suffering of the population caused by the cruelty of Gilgit’s
conqueror, Gohar Aman, whom he described as “a most bloodthirsty man” of extraor-
dinary brutality. “He seems to have had a special enmity and spite against the people
of Gilgit, who suffered terribly under his two reigns. . .” (437). Second, Drew denied
the dynastic legitimacy of the regional rajas who claimed rulership of Gilgit: “We
have seen that Karim Khan was not of the old rulers of Gilgit; his father had conquered
it; his brother and he himself had been turned out by Gaur Rahman [Gohar Aman],
who had just the same right to it as the other’s father—that is, no right at all, but
only the power of acquiring it” (438–39).
Also, the very first British visitor to Gilgit, P. A. Vans Agnew, questioned the
legitimacy of the pre-Kashmiri rulers. He traveled the area in 1847 to negotiate with
the rulers of Nager, Hunza, and Yasin. After reporting that a large part of the popu-
lation of Gilgit had been sold into slavery by the Rajas Suleman Shah, Azad Khan,
and Tahir Shah, he continued in his diary: “It is not to be wondered at that a tribe
of whom two-thirds had suffered the extreme of despotism should have lost loyalty
to their rulers. Such was the case in the time of Secundur Khan. . . . It was, however,
so distasteful to [the population] as to induce a conspiracy in favor of their neighbor
the Rajah of Yeseen by name Gour Aman” (1847, 288). Matters became worse still
for the people of Gilgit. With a certain irony, Vans Agnew went on: “Gour Aman
was recognized Rajah by the Gilgitees. He fully realized the fable and the inertness
of the deposed Chief was soon contrasted with the rapacity of his elected successor:
He sold into slavery every living soul in Gilgit upon whom he could lay hands”
(288).6 The reports of both Vans Agnew and Drew in effect legitimized Kashmiri
rule in Gilgit, even if that rule was not warranted by the Treaty of Amritsar, as Drew
realized. We can infer that in the beginning of Kashmiri domination in Gilgit, the
British and the Kashmiri discourse on the legitimacy of rule in Gilgit converged.
But, the respective discourses of legitimacy became separated when, during the reign
of Gulab Singh’s son Ranbir Singh, the British started to question whether the ma-
haraja was indeed a loyal and effective trustee of British interests in the northern
frontier region (see Yasin 1984; Alder 1963). A result of this distrust was that the
British started to pursue seriously their interest directly and with their own personnel.
After a few explorers and surveyors had traveled the area, Colonel John Biddulph went
to Gilgit in 1877 to become the first British agent there.
The maharaja was opposed to the posting of a British agent in Gilgit. From its
inception, Biddulph’s mission was regarded by the maharaja as a surveillance of Kash-
miri activities—that is, a restriction of Kashmiri domination. Consequently, from the
beginning, Biddulph was to suffer a hostile and very obstructive attitude of the Kash-
miri authorities. Kashmiri personnel effectively boycotted him, and the governor even
prohibited the people of Gilgit from working for Biddulph or trading with him
(“Memorandum on the Present Condition of Affairs in Gilgit,” OIOC, L/P&S/18/
A18/2, 1881, p. 26). Biddulph in turn was very critical of the Kashmiri way of
governing the area and wrote in his report: “The misgovernment and oppression
suffered by the people of Gilgit during the last three years exceed what they had to
endure from former Governors. After the result of this had become apparent in the
6On the history of the slave trade in the area, see Mu¨ller-Stellrecht 1981.
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recent disturbances, it would be thought that some relaxation of harshness would be
found advisable. During the last two months things have gone from bad to worse,
and the system of oppression has changed to one of wholesale plunder” (“Memorandum
on the Present Condition of Affairs in Gilgit,” OIOC, p. 27).
The “plunder” to which Biddulph refers was the forced extraction of agricultural
produce mainly for the purpose of provisioning the Kashmiri garrison. The mountain
path from Kashmir to Gilgit was long and haphazard. Moreover, it remained closed
for half of the year. Supplies for the maharaja’s troops could not be imported for the
most part, so they had to be procured locally. The people themselves had to carry
these extractions to Gilgit by way of be¯ga¯r (forced labor), a practice that was much
resented (see Vans Agnew 1847, 285).
We have no independent sources about attitudes of the people of Gilgit toward
Kashmiri rule, but the scarce remarks in the British reports such as Biddulph’s ref-
erence to “recent disturbances” and Vans Agnew’s remark about discontent indicate
that the difficulties of the Kashmiri in preserving their grip over Gilgit were not only
due to actions taken by rivaling rajas of the area who wanted the place for themselves.
The reconquest of Gilgit by Gohar Aman in 1852 might not have succeeded without
the collaboration of the local population—in spite of the earlier experience of his rule.7
In effect, Kashmiri domination in Gilgit was a matter of force. It was established
violently by conquest; it met resistance to the point of expulsion; and it could guard
itself only by way of a military force that was directed against possible local resistance,
the maintenance of which could only be secured by dispossessing the local population
of a considerable part of its produce. This was no new experience for the people, since
the local potentates before had ruled by similar means—except that some of them
could claim a certain dynastic legitimacy for their despotism.
The British established their position in Gilgit by very different means. They
never had to conquer the place. Through the Treaty of Amritsar, its dominant inter-
pretation, and British interest in establishing the Kashmiri force as a frontier guard
in Gilgit, the British provided (particularly in the last instance) the reason for the
entrenchment of the maharaja’s troops in Gilgit—after all, Jammu and Kashmir was
a native state in British India. That fact was probably not widely known in Gilgit at
that time, however, and the British thus appeared as contestants and challengers of
Kashmiri domination there, at least after Biddulph’s time. Biddulph himself was met
with deep distrust from the rulers of the neighboring valleys, especially Hunza, Nager,
and Yasin—probably because they associated him with the much-despised Kashmiri
forces. Because Biddulph was unable to establish whatever the British regarded as
“friendly relations” with these rulers and because of a reorientation of British frontier
politics, the Gilgit Agency closed down after four years in 1881.
When the agency reopened in 1889,8 Algernon Durand, the political agent at the
time, was at pains to dissociate himself from the Kashmiri officials and tried to es-
tablish direct relations with the important persons of the agency, independent of
Kashmir (1899/1977, 137). He executed a multilayered strategy of domination in
Gilgit. On the one hand, he was to back his position by military force. In addition
to two hundred Gurkha soldiers, Kashmiri Imperial Service Troops were stationed in
7The Kashmiri were only able to reconquer Gilgit in 1860 after Gohar Aman had died.
8Among other things, the efforts of the amir of Afghanistan toward Chitral, situated to
the west of Gilgit, and the continuing instability of Gilgit and the surrounding valleys pro-
vided the rationale for the renewed British presence in the area (Stellrecht 1998, 67; Yasin
1984, 89–90).
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Gilgit. That is, for the first time, a military body came to the place commanded by
British officers, who extended their own vision of discipline and training to the
troops.9 But on the other hand, Durand employed many means to enable trust and
respect on the part of those locals whom he regarded as the “natural leaders of the
country” (137).
To the horror of the Kashmiri governor, Durand sent home the hostages who
were kept by the Kashmiri authorities in Gilgit in order to prevent any hostile activ-
ities in Hunza and Nager (1899/1977, 136). Whenever he was offered gold—for
example, in support of the submission of some petition—Durand accepted the offer
symbolically by touching it and then returning it to the donor, in sharp contrast to
Kashmiri officials, who always had kept what was offered to them (1899/1977, 220–
21). Central to Durand’s strategy of domination was the annual jalsa that he estab-
lished in the first year of his term. It was a week-long celebration of British rule in
Gilgit culminating in the darba¯r, the reception of rajas and notables. Although being
present at this darba¯r meant acknowledging the British power in the area, the occasion
also implied that respect was paid to the attending rajas of the area by honoring the
rules of precedence in staging the event. A British observer emphasized the “unique
atmosphere of homage and good will to the British Government” that characterized
the darba¯r and asserted that it was “a solemn and impressive ceremony in the eyes of
the locals” (“Memorandum on the Future of the Gilgit Agency/Enclosure to Demi-
official Letter from Lt. Col. G. D. Oglivie, Resident in Kashmir,” no. 355-C/30,
December 18, 1930, OIOC, R/2[1083/286], pp. 19–20). A later political agent,
Major A. D. Macpherson, pointed to the disciplining function of this political ritual,
which gave the British officers a most effective opportunity for publicly rewarding or
reprimanding (Gilgit Diary, March 1914, OIOC, L/P&S/10/826).
At the same time, the darba¯r placed the British agent firmly above Kashmiri
authorities, as the Kashmiri governor, the wazı¯r-e waza¯rat, was (like all the rulers of
the region) required to offer nazar to the political agent. This practice was resented
and criticized with such regularity by the wazı¯r-e waza¯rat that it was noted in the
Gilgit Diary (the official record of affairs) when in 1935 the wazı¯r-e waza¯rat raised no
objection against it for the first time (March 1935, OIOC, L/P&S/12/3285). Usually
the darba¯r was followed by sportive festivities in which many people participated.
During the first of these events, Durand was able to score further respect when he,
together with his assistant and players from Gilgit, defeated the polo team from
Nager, which, according to Durand, had until then remained undefeated (1899/1977,
228). The struggle for superiority here was fought to a large extent on the field of
symbols. The British were of course not content with symbolic domination, and the
symbolic assertion of their position was backed by the newly developed military force.
In 1891 Durand showed that he was determined to turn symbolic superiority
into “real” domination whenever it was required for British interests. Safdar Ali, mı¯r
of Hunza, was not ready to accept British domination but played with the option of
opening Hunza for a Russian force. He was ordered, as a consequence, by the Gov-
ernment of India to ensure complete access to Hunza for the British (Alder 1963,
228–29). When Safdar Ali defied the order, the British military attacked a combi-
nation of men from Hunza and Nager at the fort of Nilt in Nager. Although the
position of Hunza and Nager seemed quite invulnerable due to topographical con-
9British reporter E. F. Knight, who traveled the area widely when the political agency
was reopened, emphasized the difference between these troops and the large but “undisci-
plined” and “useless” Kashmiri force that had garrisoned Gilgit before (1893/1991, 285–86).
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ditions, the forces commanded by the British officers succeeded in capturing the fort.
After that victory, both Safdar Ali and Azur (Uzr) Khan, son of Mı¯r Jafar Khan of
Nager, fled and resistance in Hunza and Nager collapsed. Nazim Khan replaced Safdar
Ali as mı¯r, and in Nager power was reverted to the old mı¯r. Except for the “siege of
Chitral” in 1895, this “Hunza-Nager campaign” was the only time when the British
used violence against one of the little states on the “Northern frontier.”
Durand’s strategy exhibited an almost Foucauldian insight into the rules of the
power game. He and his successors used force and violence only when their domination
and power were challenged. But for the most part, they relied on techniques of “im-
pression management” (Goffman 1959): they strove to appear less as antagonists and
usurpers of power than as protectors and benevolent rulers. This strategy was sum-
marized by a later British observer as follows:
[Durand’s] edifice rests upon three main props: (1) a firm belief in the invincible
strength of the British Empire, (2) an unquestionable assurance that the British
officer, and especially the Political Agent, is a creature of superior clay, who will give
protection against the Kashmir ogre, and whose voice must be hearkened to and
obeyed, as if it were the voice of a god, (3) a policy towards the people of the Political
Districts and their rulers based on liberality, justice and courtesy, with a minimum
of interference, by which their contentment should be secured.
(“Resident in Kashmir, December 14, 1927, Appendix to the ‘Administration
Report of the Gilgit Agency,’” 1927, OIOC, L/P&S/12/3288, p. 5)
This “wise policy” of the British, as journalist E. F. Knight called it (1893/1991,
285), was very effective in “pacifying” the region. This “pacification” was very different
from the strategy of domination that Kashmir had tried before and which never had
allowed the maharaja to enjoy a rulership of the area that did not constantly face
resistance and which was always in danger of eviction. The Kashmiris in Gilgit were
never in a position in which they could renounce violence—violence that nonetheless
was hardly effective. The British “pacification” of the Gilgit Agency bore all charac-
teristics of Edward Said’s description of that mode of domination—all of which Kash-
miri rule had lacked: “In a word, the Empire must be wise; it must temper its cupidity
with selflessness, and its impatience with discipline” (1995, 36–37).
The self-perceived benevolence and civilizing mission of British rule in the Gilgit
Agency is most clearly expressed in Political Agent Macpherson’s speech addressing
the rulers and notables of the agency at the darba¯r of 1911. This speech is a striking
case of self-celebratory colonial discourse and is a clear example of what Ranajit Guha
calls the “idiom of improvement,” by which the British attempted to achieve hege-
mony (1997, 30–33). British colonization of the Gilgit Agency is presented simply
as a story of progress. Comparing past and present, Macpherson celebrated the “pac-
ification” of the area and the improvements achieved by British rule:
You older men should never be tired of telling the younger generation what a dif-
ference there is in comparison with the past and telling them to whom they always
should be grateful. No interference in your religion, each man can be man and say
so, you cannot be bought and sold and sent to other countries. And all that you are
asked to do is to live at peace and obey those set on authority over you. . . . Roads
have been made, bridges erected, cultivation increased, Postal and Telegraph facilities
for all. Since I have known the Agency I have noted the great progress and difference
amongst all in the manner of increased social amenities, better clothes, most of us
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now drink tea and sugar and salt are recognized necessities. The standard of living
seems to have improved amongst all classes.
(“Speech of Political Agent Maj. Macpherson in Gilgit at Darbar Held
May 12, 1911,” OIOC, IOR R/2[1081/260])
After the Gilgit Agency had been reestablished, Kashmiri authorities stayed in
Gilgit and so remained the implicit rivalry between the British and Kashmiri, which
at times became manifest. “Dual control” was instituted. Formally, competences were
divided: Kashmir administered the Gilgit waza¯rat, which comprised the tahsil (sub-
district) of Gilgit (including Gilgit Town), Bunji, and Astor. All other parts of the
area were controlled mostly indirectly by the British. Dual control, however, did not
reduce competition for power, but rather fostered it. Time and again, the political
agent complained that the wazı¯r-e waza¯rat was encroaching upon his realm of power
(see, for example, “Report by the Resident in Kashmir on a Tour in the Gilgit Agency,
August/September 1935,” citing Political Agent Maj. Loch, 1927, OIOC, L/P&S/12/
3287, p. 5; “Memorandum on the Future of the Gilgit Agency,” 1931, OIOC, L/
P&S/12/3287, pp. 17–18),10 and most probably the opposite was equally true (al-
though I lack documentary evidence for this). The dissensions culminated in the
dispute about whether Hunza and Nager were parts of Jammu and Kashmir State.
This conflict arose when, with the scheme of the formation of the “Federation of Indian
States,” the question had to be answered whether Hunza and Nager too could join
the federation or were to be represented by Jammu and Kashmir (So¨kefeld 1997b,
261–62). From 1938 onward, this dispute produced a great number of reports and
diplomatic exchanges. For Gilgit Tahsil, the rivalry between Kashmir and Britain
was solved to a large extent when the British leased this part of the Gilgit Waza¯rat
from the maharaja in 1935.
In their reports, British officers boasted that in contrast to the Kashmiri officials,
they had been able to establish a sympathetic relationship with the inhabitants of the
area. The British resident in Kashmir wrote about the Kashmiri officials after inspect-
ing the Gilgit Agency: “Officials of this class are necessarily wholly out of sympathy
with the population with whom they have to deal. At best they are regarded with
tolerant amusement. Very often they are hated and despised. . .” (“Report of the Res-
ident in Kashmir on a Tour in the Gilgit Agency, 1927,” OIOC, L/P&S/12/3288,
n.p.). In a letter to the political secretary of the Government of India in the Foreign
and Political Department, New Delhi, the resident in Kashmir relayed that “[t]he
rulers and inhabitants of the Political Districts who are fair-skinned, followers of Islam
and natives of Central Asia look to the Political Agent as their protector against
aggression by the Maharaja, who represents to them the opposite of themselves in
every way and the embodiment of all that India has always stood for in Central Asian
eyes” (quoting the resident in Kashmir of 1927, October 10, 1933, OIOC, R/2[1078/
241], n.p.). This statement of the resident can be read not only as establishing a
contrast between the “inhabitants of the Political Districts” and the Kashmiri but
also as affirming the opposition between the British and Kashmiri. The British and
the people of the Gilgit Agency were situated on the same side of the opposition. The
British and the people of Gilgit shared some characteristics but were not the same
and equal. The British subjects in the agency were, in Homi Bhabha’s words, “almost
the same, but not quite” (1994, 86). This similarity was not a matter of mimicry of
10This Kashmiri-British competition was not only limited to the Gilgit Agency but also
concerned the position of the maharaja in Srinagar.
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and education to British ways of life, as in the cases that Bhabha analyzes, but rather
was a matter of nature, of (almost) common race: the “fair-skinned” inhabitants of the
Gilgit Agency were, to quote Bhabha again, almost the same and almost white (89).
The Gilgit Scouts and British Power
The most important means by which the British ensured the collaboration of at
least a decisive part of the Gilgit Agency’s inhabitants—and perhaps the most ingen-
ious instrument of power that they ever developed there—was the creation of the
Gilgit Scouts Corps, a body of locally recruited paramilitary troops. In 1892, a year
after the Hunza-Nager campaign, Algernon Durand raised a body of local military
levies from Punial, Nager, and Hunza, thereby turning erstwhile enemies of the Brit-
ish into collaborators. The recruits ceased to be targets of British force and became
elements and instruments of British power. Durand himself explained the feasibility
of this scheme with the character of the people’s “race” and their psychological con-
stitution of being not “warlike” but “peaceful” (1899/1977, 206–8). The levies were
called out for training one month of the year and remained in their villages the rest
of the time. “[T]o impress on the men the very important fact that they were the
servants of the government of India all the year round” (Amar Singh Chohan 1984,
193), they received regular pay every month. In 1913 the military levies were turned
into the Gilgit Scouts. The number of recruits increased, and their training was
intensified. The Gilgit Scouts consisted of eight companies of eighty men each. There
were two companies each from Hunza and Nager and one company each from Yasin,
Gupis, Punial, and Gilgit. When the British leased the Gilgit Tahsil in 1935, the
Gilgit Scouts were transformed into a permanent body and replaced the Imperial
Service Troops at Gilgit.
The local levies and Gilgit Scouts were not raised for military purposes only.
Much more importantly, they procured an intimate bond between the British and a
considerable part of the population. In the course of revisions of the scheme of levies
and scouts, this intimacy was constantly extended. For instance, the time spent with
British officers for training was prolonged, the number of scouts under training at
one time was reduced, and finally in 1935 the scouts were converted from a part-time
to a full-time troop. The effect of the Gilgit Scouts scheme can be understood best
by employing the Foucauldian concept of discipline. According to Foucault (1979a),
discipline should not be seen primarily as repressive and negative, but as transfor-
mative, even educative, enabling the management of the subject population (see also
Hindess 1996, 113–15). As members of the Gilgit Scouts Corps, the men of the
Gilgit Agency were imparted with British visions of regularity, of command and
obedience, of order, in short. Important for the intimacy with the British, however,
was not only the time actually shared with them. Equally significant was the material
remuneration for their services, as it made both the scouts and their dependents and
relatives conscious of the boons of British rule (Amar Singh Chohan 1984, 196, 198).
To be a member of the Gilgit Scouts, in addition to all the material gains, was
considered a great honor in a society in which questions of honor and rank were of
the highest importance. The Gilgit Scouts both strengthened the bonds between the
British and the population of the Gilgit Agency and also contributed to the loyalty
of the rajas. Although recruitment into the scouts had to be sanctioned ultimately by
a British officer, proposals for recruitment were made by the local ruler. Being favored
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by the raja was in most cases the sine qua non for recruitment. Thus, the mı¯rs and
rajas gained an important instrument of influence, as they of course recommended
their own relatives and followers. Furthermore, the positions of noncommissioned or
junior commissioned officers in the Scouts Corps were usually filled with close relatives
of the rajas or with members of other elite families. In hindsight, Shah Khan, one of
the veterans of the freedom struggle of 1947, remarked that the Gilgit Scouts were
political bait to the local Chieftains, Mirs and Rajas. They were intentionally kept
away from education but were frequently reminded of the generosity and liberality
of the British Government who had conferred on them such a great honor as the
Viceroy’s Commission. A VCO [Viceroy’s Commissioned officer] of the Corps was
allowed to maintain a special tunic[,] his own horses, private servants and many other
formalities deemed essential for the royalty. After the British officers, they were the
most powerful people respected by the Government, public, Mirs and Rajas equally.
(quoted in Dani 1989, 312)
The scouts served to distinguish the British further from the Kashmiri. Although
the state government bore a considerable part of the costs of the scouts scheme, it had
no hand in the scouts’ organization or any influence on their command (Amar Singh
Chohan 1984, 195–96). The relations established by way of the scouts scheme between
the British/elite families and ordinary men of the agency bypassed the Kashmiri
administration completely.
In contrast to Kashmiri domination, British rule in the Gilgit Agency became in
part “hegemonic.” “Hegemony” here does not mean a body of legitimating ideologies
produced by intellectuals that has the effect of ensuring the consent of the subalterns
(see Gramsci 1971, 12). In Gilgit a rather more implicit shared understanding de-
veloped out of a body of practices that gave the British not only an unassailable position
but also an aura of being of a similar, even if superior, kind (“the same, but not
quite”). Certainly not all sections of the population agreed to this hegemony; thus,
British rule did not become hegemonic in a general sense as defined by Ranajit Guha
in terms of persuasion outweighing coercion (1997, 23). But, those subjects of the
British who shared this “practical hegemony” because of their involvement with the
colonial masters through serving in the Gilgit Scouts Corps or assisting them in
hunting expeditions or in their explorations of geography and local culture regarded
the British as benevolent elders rather than as illegitimate usurpers of power.11 Their
local servants executed for the British the roles of mediators or “deputies,” similar to
the function of intellectuals in the Gramscian model of hegemony designed for West-
ern society.
Two elements are crucial for this hegemony. The first is the distinction between
the British and Kashmiri, which allowed for the perception of the British in a very
different way by the local population, although they too represented a foreign domi-
nating power—even more than the Kashmiris did. The second element is a kind of
cultural consensus established by shared values and practices that subjects could read
as a British affirmation of local lifeways and virtues. In particular, the keen interest
of British officers in polo and hunting could only mean that they shared the local
values and virtues of manliness. Last but not least, many British officers took a deep
interest in local culture and languages, which found its expression in numerous books
and reports. This interest was certainly not completely innocent but contributed to
11At the time of my fieldwork, many children of former servants of the British as well as
aged veterans of the Gilgit Scouts still spoke with high esteem of the former masters and
especially their engagement in hunting, mountaineering, and playing polo.
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making British rule “smooth”—that is, more adaptable to local circumstances.12 The
role that religion played in emphasizing the difference between the British and Kash-
miri and in fostering an understanding between the British and their local subjects
is not entirely clear. Sometimes British officers remarked that the Kashmiri “kafirs”
were despised by the Muslims of the agency, but after all, the British themselves were
not Muslim believers either. During World War I, the British feared religiously
motivated revolts against their rule (So¨kefeld 2002). One matter at least was crucial:
slaughtering cows was prohibited by the maharaja’s law. This rule was resented very
much by the Muslim people of the agency, especially because it was sanctioned with
severe punishment (Usman Ali 1990, 98–99).
Tensions of Domination: Protest and Resistance
Practical hegemony was not total in the Gilgit Agency. The people perceived and
resented oppression and exploitation, especially the various practices of appropriating
agricultural produce and be¯ga¯r, or kar be¯ga¯r (forced labor). These exploitative practices
were not invented by the British, but rather were inherited from previous systems of
domination. Under both local rajas and Kashmiri rule, the burden of taxes and be¯ga¯r
had been excessive (Usman Ali 1990, 28–36). Be¯ga¯r was rendered especially for trans-
port purposes but also in the context of military activities. Before the British extension
of the road via Astor to Kashmir facilitated transport by pack animals, all supplies
had to be carried by porters from Kashmir to Gilgit. This service was not only very
arduous and dangerous but moreover kept the people from their agricultural work.
British reporter E. F. Knight criticized the Kashmiri for “the unnecessary inhumanity
with which the begar has been conducted on the Gilgit road [which] has driven the
inhabitants to desperation, compelling them to fly from their homes, and thus still
further diminishing the scanty population” (1893/1991, 285). This criticism implies
that the British, in contrast, were more “human” in their demand for forced labor and
employed be¯ga¯r only insofar as it was “necessary.” The British, however, were not
“humane” to the extent of abolishing this practice. They too required forced labor for
transport, and they established regulations concerning which village was to supply
how many men for what distance of travel. British officers were content to record
complaints by the people against be¯ga¯r drawn by Kashmiri authorities, but this cer-
tainly does not allow the conclusion that the same people carried British loads vol-
untarily.
The case is the same for complaints about heavy taxation and the draining of
agricultural produce. For instance, Political Agent B. E. M. Gurdon noted: “I have
received complaints from some of the zemindars that the state officials compel them
to furnish the supplies, required by them for their private consumption, at rates
considerably lower than those prevailing in the open market. They also complain of
excessive kar begar and the petty tyranny practiced by the police” (Gilgit Diary, July
1905, OIOC, L/P&S/7/180/1397, n.p.). Besides regular taxation, farmers were forced
to sell part of their produce at very low, nonremunerative rates which were fixed by
the administration. Hukmı¯ kha¯rı¯d (ordered purchase), as it was called, was practiced
12Although local knowledge was crucial for the British mode of domination, not all knowl-
edge was collected directly for administrative purposes. The most obvious example of this is
D. L. R. Lorimer, who, having been a political agent, returned years later to the agency without
any office to complete his studies of the Burushaski language.
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and sanctioned by the British as much as it was by the Kashmiri. To ensure the
provisions of the Gilgit garrison, farmers were forced to supply grain, in addition to
milk, eggs, and chicken (the re¯s system), to feed the officers.
When “native” officer Thakur Singh compiled the “Assessment Report for the
Gilgit Tahsil” in 1917, he recorded much protest against these services, regardless of
whether they were required by the British or by the Kashmiri authorities. He noted:
“The system heavily tells upon the supplier zamindars, who have been feeling no
small hardship and burden upon them, in as much as they are required to supply
milk by way of Begar under most pressing circumstances” (1917, 42). Even though
the British officers knew well that these exploitative practices were a heavy burden
for the people, his recommendation to abolish hukmı¯ kha¯rı¯d was turned down (93).
The supply and transport officer on special duty in Kashmir simply remarked in 1915:
“A Kashmiri will not stir without a ‘Hukm’ [order], and still less, I believe, an
inhabitant of the Gilgit Agency” (quoted in Thakur Singh 1917, 161). The real
problem, then, was the perceived laziness of the people; British pressure and orders
were just the remedy for this evil.13
Framed in these terms, hukmı¯ kha¯rı¯d (as well as be¯ga¯r) could well be understood
and justified as part of the overall British civilizing mission: it disciplined the colonial
subjects. The resident in Kashmir, somewhat contradictorily, came to the cynical
conclusion that all these “hardships” were no actual hardships for the people of the
agency because they were long accustomed to them and simply did not know otherwise
(Thakur Singh 1917, 93). Although Maharaja Hari Singh abolished be¯ga¯r in Kashmir
in 1933, it continued to be practiced in the Gilgit Agency—and also after the lease
of the agency by the British in 1935 (Usman Ali 1990, 32).
From these source emerges a rather different picture: an image of constant tension
between British officers and their subjects, who had no choice but to supply them
with labor, grain, eggs, milk, and fowl, without proper return. At least on one oc-
casion, the British used force to quell resistance to be¯ga¯r. In 1940 unrest in Yasin
reached a stage which required the Gilgit Scouts to put down the protest and arrest
twelve leaders (“Administration Report of the Gilgit Agency,” 1940, OIOC, L/P&S/
12/3288, p. 6). This was not the only occasion when the British were confronted with
protesting voices of the people of the Gilgit Agency. Such events were always framed
in British records as matters of dissent between local rulers and their subjects. Inter-
estingly, the British were often addressed as arbitrators by protesting peasants. Earlier,
in the winter of 1937–38, deputations from a number of villages in Hunza and Nager
came to see the political agent in Gilgit to appeal for redress: those from Nager (from
the villages Bud, Budelas, Chalt, Chaprot, Sikanderabad, and Yal) protested the ex-
cessive demand for be¯ga¯r and taxes by the mı¯r and the other members of the royal
family, whereas the delegates from Hunza (from the villages of Mayun and Hindi)
complained about the appropriation of land by the mı¯r. In both cases, the political
agent refused to act on behalf of the peasants. Both cases were explained with reference
13Thakur Singh too subscribed to the thesis of the “laziness” of the inhabitants of Gilgit,
who seemed to care only slightly for their fields, but also supplied a possible explanation for
their apparent neglect of agricultural work: “The people of Gilgit, unlike those of Hunza-
Nagar and Skardu, are generally lazy and appear to take not much pains in cultivating their
lands. They have no liking for manual labor. . . . Another difficulty, that perhaps stands in the
way of the people attending to their fields properly, appears to be the burden of Kar-begar.
With the exception of ploughing and other hard duties the work of agriculture is mainly left
to womenfolk” (1917, 65). Of course, if the men were kept busy with be¯ga¯r, they had to leave
work in the fields to the women (see Usman Ali 1990, 32).
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to local rivals of the mı¯rs. That is, the peasants protested because they were incited
to do so by Raja Khisro Khan (in the case of Nager) and Qudratullah Beg (in that of
Hunza); they did not come only because they were exploited (Gilgit Diary, January
1938, OIOC, L/P&S/12/3285).
Similar events had already occurred in 1930. In February of that year, delegates
again from Hindi and Mayun came to Gilgit to register their complaints about what
they considered an increased and unjustified demand for be¯ga¯r by the mı¯r of Hunza
(Gilgit Diary, February 1930, OIOC, L/P/10/973). The administrative report of the
year recorded: “Some disgruntled zamindars of Hini [Hindi] and Mayun started an
agitation against the Mir, protesting that he was imposing new burdens upon them
not recognized in established custom. The agitators are not true Hunzawals of the
Mir’s own clan but Shinakis originally from Gilgit direction, and have ever been less
loyal to the Mirs of Hunza” (“Administration Report of the Gilgit Agency,” 1930,
OIOC, L/P&S/12, 3288, p. 2).14 For the British, then, the matter was simply one of
loyalty toward the mı¯r—without regard for the fact that the inhabitants of Shina-
speaking villages of lower Hunza were taxed at a much higher rate than the
Burushaski-speaking population of central Hunza (Kreutzmann 1996, 283) and that
consequently it would have been much more plausible to understand the issue (in-
cluding the supposed disloyalty) in terms of exploitation by the mı¯r. The protest of
a delegation from Nager in March 1930 was framed in similar terms (Gilgit Diary,
March 1930, OIOC, L/P&S/10/973).
From these sketches of dissent as registered in British records, the peasants appear
to have very well understood the structure of domination in the Gilgit Agency. British
power personified by the political agent guaranteed the position of local rulers as long
as they did not interfere with British interests. Accordingly, redress from excessive
exploitation by the rulers could only be hoped for by way of the intervention of the
political agent. The British warranty of power for the local rulers was also responsible
for the rajas’ and mı¯rs’ ability to draw be¯ga¯r and demand taxes in excess. No rival
powers were left within the petty states that could endanger the position of the rulers
or that would have forced them to seek the consent of their subjects. Another con-
clusion which can be drawn from the reports of protest in British documents is that
the British themselves never felt endangered or even challenged by these events. From
their perspective, they ruled out the dissent because it was unjustified in terms of
local rules and custom (Gilgit Diary, January 1938, OIOC, L/P&S/12/3285).
Transition of Power, Crumbling of Domination:
Events in 1947 and 1948
The self-image of benevolence and paternal rule cultivated by the British cul-
minated on the eve of their retreat from the Gilgit Agency in 1947. According to a
young British officer, this self-image emerges with such overdrawing that now, more
than fifty years later, it can be read almost as a parody:
Until the official from Kashmir actually arrived in Gilgit, the people of the Agency
would not believe that the British were leaving them. Their faith in us was unshake-
able—they could not believe that we would desert them and hand them over to a
14“Shinakis” are speakers of Shina, whereas the population of central Hunza speaks Bu-
rushaski.
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bunch of Hindu babus. Even after they had been given the details of the change-
over, they did not seem to grasp the full significance of what it all meant to them
and their lovely valleys. . . . To illustrate the feelings of the tribesmen in the Agency
at the time of handing-over, I will here describe briefly the handing-over ceremony
that took place in Chilas, the most turbulent and ungovernable part of the Agency.
Thousands of tribesmen had foregathered in the compound of the Fort at Chilas. The
Scouts Guard of Honor were drawn up smartly at the foot of the flagpole. Officials
from Kashmir and Gushpur Muzaffar Khan (representing Captain Hamilton, APA
[assistant political agent], who refused to take part in such an ignoble ceremony)
were present. The Union Jack was fluttering from the flag staff over the Fort for the
last time. The tribesmen, fierce, rugged as the mountains amongst which they live,
menacingly fingered long knives, axes, and antiquated matchlocks. At one word from
Captain Hamilton they would have cut down those Hindus present and torn up the
Kashmir flag. But without his approval they would have done nothing. The Guard
of Honor again presented arms to the Union Jack and the thousands of tribesmen
present broke into great cheers for the British Raj. Many of these hardy warriors,
accustomed to acts of unparalleled cruelty, broke down. Slowly the Union Jack was
dragged to the ground. The Guard of Honor again presented arms—this time to the
green and yellow emblem of Kashmir. The Hindus present called for three cheers for
the Maharaja. But no answering shout greeted them. Only the noise of a distant
thunder was heard as the mighty tribesmen turned their backs and, cursing and
threatening, returned to their mountain valleys. We have deserted a most loyal and
noble people. May those responsible live to rue the day!
(Gilgit Diary, OIOC, L/P&S/13/1860, pp. 57–59)
The words and phrases used in this statement are indeed remarkable. That the
British left the Gilgit Agency was not a matter of liberation, but of deserting their
most loyal subjects. All these subjects seem to have done nothing but enjoy British
rule (contrary to the many British reports of unrest especially from the region of
Chilas). If even the fierce tribals of Chilas and the Indus Valley cheered for the British
raj, how much more heartwarming must the reaction have been of the more refined
and almost civilized inhabitants of Gilgit, Hunza, or Nager? Even nature registered
its disapproval of the British departure by a “distant thunder.” We are assured that
the relationship between British rulers and local subjects had an almost religious
dimension; it was a matter of “unshakeable faith.” The description earlier of Political
Agent Algernon Durand resonates here—that the political agent’s “voice must be
hearkened to and obeyed, as if it were the voice of a god.” Certainly these “believers”
in British power would have killed the Kashmiris present at the ceremony in Chilas
at the word of their officers, and it was equally certain that they were paralyzed and
unable to act without such a word.
Even if these sentences of a disappointed British officer cannot be taken at their
face value, the fact remains that there was nothing like a Quit India Movement in
the Gilgit Agency. People were much more alarmed by reports about violent Hindu-
Muslim conflicts in India than about the issue of British rule or freedom (So¨kefeld
1997b, 266–67). What seemed to matter most was not the question of whether the
British left, but what was to come after: India or Pakistan. The independence move-
ment in India had been divided into two factions, one led by the Congress Party with
Jawaharlal Nehru and Gandhi, the other by the Muslim League under Mohammad
Ali Jinnah. Mohammad Ali Jinnah promoted the idea that there were two nations in
the subcontinent: a Hindu nation and a Muslim nation. According to this two-nations
theory, these two nations differed to the extent that they could not live together in a
single independent state (see Jalal 1985; Hasan 1993; Talbot 1996). Therefore, Mo-
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hammad Ali Jinnah demanded the partition of the subcontinent into a state for Hin-
dus (India) and one for Muslims (Pakistan). When the British accepted this demand,
partition took place. Muslim majority areas were to become Pakistan, while regions
with a mainly Hindu population formed India. In princely states, the rulers could
decide for either India or Pakistan. Normally they had the same religious affiliation
as the majority of their subjects. In Jammu and Kashmir, however, both principles
contradicted one another, as a Hindu maharaja ruled over a Muslim majority popu-
lation. For the time being, Maharaja Hari Singh decided neither for India nor for
Pakistan. Yet, the people of Gilgit, who all were Muslims except for a small section
of Kashmiri Hindus, clearly favored joining Pakistan.
The British gave control of the Gilgit Agency to the maharaja of Kashmir, who,
during the following months, remained undecided himself. A Kashmiri governor,
Brigadier Ghansar Singh, was sent to Gilgit but was unable to establish power. He
lacked both the consent and the force to do so. The Gilgit Scouts, who before had
been a crucial instrument in the British continuation of power, became now a power
in themselves—a power aiming with increasing determination at the establishment
of a Pakistani administration in Gilgit. From all we know about the British-Kashmiri
rivalry in Gilgit, it was foreseeable that the officers of the Gilgit Scouts would not
readily serve a Kashmiri administration. It is still surprising, however, how self-
assuredly the officers faced Governor Ghansar Singh in their very first meeting. The
governor’s report converges with the story told by Subedar Major Babar Khan, the
most senior local scouts officer: on the day of Ghansar Singh’s arrival, Babar Khan
and his companions told the governor that they wished for Gilgit to become a part
of Pakistan. The governor was confronted with a list of demands by the Gilgit Scouts,
summing up the conditions under which they were ready to serve the maharaja (Ghan-
sar Singh 1983, 25–26). Safiullah Beg, one of the veterans of these events and at the
time a subedar of the Gilgit Scouts, recounted that the first demand was that the
Gilgit Scouts, still a “civil armed [i.e., paramilitary] force,” should become regular
members of the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces (interview, February 24, 1992).
The demand sounds more opportunistic than political; according to Babar Khan’s
report, however, this condition had definite political significance. Babar Khan com-
plained that although the great majority of the state’s population was Muslim, Mus-
lims were greatly underrepresented in the State Forces. Ghansar Singh justified this
state of affairs with the argument that Muslims were no “martial race” and that they
were accordingly not fit for military service. To this, Babar Khan replied: “If the
Muslims of Kashmir do not belong to a martial race, we inhabitants of Gilgit can
correct this shortcoming” (Babar Khan 1973, 27). At stake here, then, was discrim-
ination against the majority of Muslims within a Hindu-ruled Jammu and Kashmir
State. Ghansar Singh was unable to fulfill the demands of the scouts but agreed to
forward them to the maharaja, promising to have an answer within a week.15
Besides the Gilgit Scouts, regular Jammu and Kashmir State Forces were also
posted in the area. Their garrison was in Bunji, the place on the eastern banks of the
Indus River which during the time of the British lease of the Gilgit Agency had
marked the border of Kashmir territory. These troops consisted of a Sikh and a Muslim
company. When Ghansar Singh arrived at Gilgit, the Sikh company was called there.
15According to Ghansar Singh’s report, similar demands were made the following day by
the civil employees of the agency. They too declared their wish to join Pakistan but said that
they were ready to serve the maharaja under the condition that their salaries were raised (1983,
26).
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The governor wanted the Gilgit Scouts to evacuate the Gilgit barracks and have the
State Forces stationed there instead, but the Gilgit Scouts refused to leave. The State
Forces had to camp on the new polo ground in Gilgit (Babar Khan 1973, 26). Ac-
cording to a number of witnesses with whom I spoke in 1992, the people of the town
very much resented the comportment of the Sikh soldiers. They allegedly washed
themselves half-naked in the water channels and walked around in the fields, thereby
obstructing the agricultural work of the women who were not supposed to be seen
by strangers. When the scouts continued to refuse to evacuate the barracks, the State
Forces returned to Bunji to prevent open conflict.
Ghansar Singh’s assessment of the public opinion at the time of his takeover
appears to have been only wishful thinking: “The general impression was that the
British officers did not like the change over, but the Gilgit public, however, was
highly pleased with the transfer of power and they welcomed the change. . .” (1983,
25). We can infer that indeed many officers were resentful of having to depart the
agency; however, it still seemed that in contrast to the people of Gilgit, they thought
it natural and correct that the agency was given to Kashmir and not to Pakistan. At
one point, Babar Khan criticized Political Agent Major Roger N. Bacon for not having
inquired about the Gilgit Scouts’ opinion on the future of the agency, to which Bacon
simply answered: “[L]ook, this is a part of the State. . .” (1973, 26). Apparently the
maharaja also regarded the British as guarantors of the integration of the Gilgit
Agency into Jammu and Kashmir State, for he appointed two British officers, Major
William A. Brown and Captain Jock Mathieson, as commanders of the Gilgit Scouts.
By the end of August, the maharaja’s reply to the demands of the scouts had still
not arrived. Several times the governor tried to hold an oath-taking ceremony in which
the Gilgit Scouts were to swear their loyalty and allegiance to the maharaja, but the
scouts refused to take the oath unless their demands were fulfilled. Secretly the officers
of the Gilgit Scouts and important civilians made preparations for accession to Paki-
stan. On the occasion of the darba¯r in mid-October, when not only the rajas but also
the officers of the State Forces’ companies of Bunji were present in Gilgit, the officers
of both the Gilgit Scouts and the Muslim company of the State Forces met and took
an oath that they would risk their lives to make the Gilgit Agency part of Pakistan
(Syed Durrani 1985, 377). When it had become known that, under the pressure of
several uprisings and the invasion by Muslim warriors, Maharaja Hari Singh had
declared on October 27, 1947, the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to the
Indian Union, the freedom struggle in Gilgit began.
The subsequent events, which I have analyzed in detail elsewhere (So¨kefeld
1997a), shall be summarized here: Ghansar Singh was arrested, the Muslim soldiers
of the Bunji garrison sided with the Gilgit Scouts regarding Pakistan, and the Sikh
company fled into the mountains. Also, the two British officers of the Gilgit Scouts,
more or less uneasy, supported the case for Pakistan. In Gilgit a provisional govern-
ment of the “Islamic Republic of Gilgit” was formed, which invited the Government
of Pakistan to take over the administration. On November 16, Mohammad Alam,
representing Pakistani authority, arrived by plane and assumed office as political
agent. Hastily, all available men were recruited into the newly formed “freedom
forces,” which advanced toward Kashmir and Baltistan and fought against Indian
troops. On January 1, 1949, a ceasefire was called after the mediation of the United
Nations. As a result, a considerable part of former Jammu and Kashmir State came
under the influence of Pakistan either, as in the case of Azad Kashmir, under a formally
independent government that nevertheless depended heavily on Pakistan or, in the
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case of the Gilgit Agency and Baltistan (“Gilgit Baltistan”), directly controlled by
the Government of Pakistan.
Pakistani Rule in Gilgit:
A New Colonial Situation?
Although apparently successful, the officers of the Gilgit Scouts did not achieve
what they had sworn to stake their lives for. Gilgit has not, to this day, become de
jure a part of Pakistan. During the very first days after the arrival of Political Agent
Mohammad Alam, it became obvious to the local leaders of the freedom struggle that
their ideas of freedom did not match those of Mohammad Alam. He deprived them
of all authority and competence. It remains unclear to what extent the ensuing dif-
ficulties between the political agent and the local officers—especially Captain Hassan
Khan, the commandant of the Muslim company of the State Forces at Bunji who had
become “commander in chief” of the insurgent troops—were due to political differ-
ences concerning the question of self-determination in the Gilgit Agency or simply
to a disillusionment of personal ambitions (for details, see “Precis of the Events in
Gilgit since the Arrival of Sardar Mohd Alam, Political Agent,” OIOC, L/P&S/13/
1860; So¨kefeld 1997a). It probably was a combination of both. Also, the military
command was taken by a “Pakistani” officer, Colonel Aslam (aka Colonel Pasha), who
came from what had become Azad Kashmir. The Gilgit Scouts and the other local
military involved had risen from subalterns to a dominant power, but now they were
to become subalterns again.
In the beginning, things had seemed to be very different. The people in Gilgit
had succeeded in putting an end to Kashmiri rule in their area. A Pakistani admin-
istration in Gilgit was installed. Major Brown described the joy of welcoming Mo-
hammad Alam, the man who was to establish Pakistan, to Gilgit:
He was given an enthusiastic welcome by the local population and escorted in tri-
umph to the Agency House. In a few well chosen words he exhorted the people to
cast aside their faction feeling and unite as one in the cause of Islam. This short
speech was greeted with further burst of enthusiasm before the crowd gradually
dispersed. On the 17th November at 9.30 a.m. the Pakistan flag was hoisted on the
flag pole at the Agency House whilst a Guard of Honor from the Gilgit Scouts paid
full honours and the pipes and drums played the Royal Salute. Large crowds turned
out to watch the ceremony and the intense approval of all was very noticeable.
(“Precis of the Events in Gilgit since the Arrival of
Sardar Mohd Alam, Political Agent,” OIOC, n.p.)
On the next day, however, the political agent made clear to the insurgent officers that
the command was now his. Slowly, many people realized that the aims of their struggle
would not achieve fruition in the new administration; British reports claimed that
Mohammad Alam did not meet the expectations of the people of Gilgit (see “C. B.
Duke, High Commissioner for the UK, Peshawar, Based on a Report of Maj. Brown
after Leaving Gilgit,” January 19, 1948, OIOC, L/P&S/13/1860). Not only had the
scouts become subalterns again, but all the exploitative colonial practices that the
people had constantly resented were also continued by the new administration.
During the freedom struggle, the people had been willing to continue paying
taxes to support the actions of the scouts, as Usman Ali notes (1990, 123). But after
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the war, practices such as be¯ga¯r, re¯s, and heavy taxation were not abolished. In most
parts of the Gilgit Agency, the mı¯rs or rajas remained autonomous in internal affairs
and continued their despotic rule. Usman Ali summarizes: “We inherited all evils of
the times of Dogras and the British: FCR [Frontier Crimes Regulation, a special
procedural law], taxes, raja rule, hukmı¯ kha¯rı¯d, be¯ga¯r, the trouble of re¯s, all this was
in one or another form preserved” (1990, 132; on the FCR, see So¨kefeld 1997b). These
continuities provoked growing alienation between the people and the new adminis-
tration.
In Gilgit a number of people started to protest certain practices of the new ad-
ministration regarded as unjust, including be¯ga¯r and taxation. The protest was si-
lenced in the name of Islamic unity (which apparently did not allow for dissent with
the rulers), and the leaders of the protest were arrested. The Gilgit Scouts continued
to serve the dominant power. In 1951 residents of Punial protested the taxation by
the raja (Qudratullah Beg 1967, 82). When the demonstrations did not stop, the raja
of Punial ordered some of his followers to shoot at the unruly people. Six persons were
killed. Immediately, a section of Gilgit Scouts was sent to arrest not those who had
opened fire, but those who had dared to express their discontent (Qudratullah Beg
1967, 83). At the end of the 1960s, a large resistance movement against the despotism
of the mı¯r of Nager demanded the reduction of be¯ga¯r and taxation as well as certain
participation of the residents in the public affairs of Nager. Again, the scouts were
sent against the people. After shootings at a demonstration at Chalt in Nager in 1970,
nine persons were killed and many more wounded. The leaders of the protest were
imprisoned (So¨kefeld 1997b, 282).
After these events in Nager, many people were shocked that the Gilgit Scouts,
who were still regarded as a force of freedom, had turned violently against the people.
Some of the members of the Gilgit Scouts too had reflected upon their role. In the
beginning of 1971, a large protest movement emerged in Gilgit, leading to a general
strike (for details, see So¨kefeld 1997b, 284–89). When people started to attack the
police station and the prison to liberate their arrested leaders, the scouts were ordered
by their nonlocal (Punjabi and Pashtun) officers to shoot into the crowd. This time,
however, the scouts refused to obey the command and either fired only into the air
or refused to shoot at all. Locally, these incidents are sometimes called the “revolution
of Gilgit” (inqila¯b-e Gilgit). Troops from the North-West Frontier Province—that is,
nonlocal troops—were called in to end the insurgency. Soon after, repression gave
way to a period of reform when, during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s term as prime minister
and later as president of Pakistan, the administration of the Northern Areas changed
in a number of significant ways. Taxation, be¯ga¯r, and raja rule were abolished. The
region now called the “Northern Areas” seemed to be on the verge of becoming a
regular province of Pakistan. The reforms ended, however, when General Zia ul Haq
took power in 1977.
A last significant action of the Gilgit Scouts that occurred under the administra-
tion of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto should be narrated. After 1972 society in Gilgit became
increasingly torn by a militant conflict between Shiites and Sunnis. Allegedly this
conflict was originally instigated in Gilgit by the government to break the unity of
the people. When in the beginning of 1975 the Shiite muharram (mourning) proces-
sion was shot at from the Sunni main mosque in Gilgit, the Sunni qa¯zı¯ (head of the
main mosque) was arrested by the deputy commissioner. A force of armed Sunnis
moved toward Gilgit from the southern parts of the Northern Areas to liberate their
leader. Once the Shiites found out about this advance, they marched in arms from
Nager toward Gilgit. To prevent an imminent clash, the Gilgit Scouts marched out
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and stopped both the Shiites and Sunnis before they reached the town. Soon after that,
the Gilgit Scouts were dissolved; a new troop was installed, the “Northern Light
Infantry” (NLI). The Gilgit Scouts had always been a body of locals under the com-
mand of nonlocal officers, but in the new (regular) military body, local soldiers were
mixed with nonlocals. That is, for the first time, no local armed force existed in the
area. Many people in Gilgit whom I interviewed drew a connection between the al-
leged governmental instigation of Shiite-Sunni tensions and the dissolution of the
Gilgit Scouts. Although it seems far fetched, they suggested that the scouts were
abolished because they had prevented a religious war and thus obstructed a divide-
and-rule strategy. Those who entertain such a suspicion see their opinion reaffirmed
by events in 1988 when a Sunni armed force violently attacked Shiite villages close
to Gilgit and was in no way hindered by the regular army—a local force that could
have impeded the ensuing atrocities like the scouts had done in 1975 no longer
existed.
During the military rule of Zia ul Haq, oppositional political action in Gilgit
was almost impossible. But since the late 1980s, a number of political groups have
been formed by people of the area which aim at improving the unsatisfactory political
and constitutional status of the Northern Areas. This development is also due to
general political liberalization since the end of the dictatorship. One consequence of
this liberalization was that political discrimination became utterly visible: a number
of general elections have been held since the death of Zia ul Haq in 1988, but the
inhabitants of the Northern Areas have never had the right to cast their votes because
the Northern Areas is de jure not a part of Pakistan. The new political organizations
of the Northern Areas became the bearers of a nationalist discourse, asserting a dis-
tinctive national identity of the Northern Areas in contrast to Pakistan (So¨kefeld
1997b, 301–9; 1999).16 Thus, the idea of national unity with Pakistan, conceived
originally on the basis of the assumption of a Muslim nation in South Asia as for-
mulated by Mohammad Ali Jinnah in his two-nations theory, was discursively chal-
lenged. In the body of texts and speeches constituting this nationalist discourse, the
Pakistani administration of the Northern Areas is termed explicitly a “colonial” (nau-
a¯ba¯dı¯atı¯) system.17
Since 1992, oppositional groups have refused to celebrate November 1, the an-
niversary of the beginning of the freedom struggle, as “freedom day.” They celebrate
instead a “day of martyrs” (yo¯m-e shuhada). For August 14, 1997, the fiftieth anniver-
sary of the independence of Pakistan, which was to be commemorated all over the
country, members of these groups planned a huge demonstration against this, in their
opinion, “black day” for the Northern Areas. But, their plans could not be carried
16It is quite difficult to assess the strength of nationalist oppositional parties such as the
Balawaristan National Front or the Karakorum National Movement in terms of membership
because for political reasons there are no formal provisions such as member lists or regular fees.
Activists are present in many villages besides Gilgit, however, and the groups are able to
mobilize so many people for demonstrations and other activities that the administration con-
siders them a danger. A few party leaders have developed quite a high profile in the media.
17Referring to the resolutions of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP),
which provided for “local rule” in Gilgit-Baltistan, one activist draws the following compar-
ison: “It was clearly mentioned in the resolution . . . that the area will be administered by the
local authorities under the surveillance of the commission but, the Govt. of Pakistan occupied
this area just like East India Company making it a colony violating the UNCIP’s resolutions
and this fraudulent occupation is continued since last half century” (Amir Hamza n.d., 2). For
a book-length interpretation of the history of the Northern Areas in terms of Pakistan’s co-
lonialism, see Abdul Hamid Khan 2001.
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out. The day before, a number of oppositional political leaders were arrested, and more
were detained on August 14 while gathering in the center of Gilgit. The demonstra-
tion was prevented by police force. Altogether, about sixty oppositional activists were
arrested and, accused of treason, remained in detention for several weeks. Some of
them were seriously mistreated while under arrest. This was not the first time that
an oppositional demonstration was dissolved by force. Very often, section 144 of the
Pakistan Criminal Procedure Code is enforced in the Northern Areas, prohibiting
assemblies of more than four persons and providing the legal means for the prevention
of political action unpopular with the government.
Another violent event had occurred in June 1996. A new body of “Northern
Scouts” had been planned by the administration. These Northern Scouts were to enlist
mainly local young men. Unemployment is a major problem in the Northern Areas
(as generally it is in Pakistan). Public administration is the major employer in Gilgit,
but due to a halt of recruitment there had been no new opportunities for employment
in a number of years.18 Recruitment for the “Northern Scouts” was scheduled for June
22 at Gilgit College, and several hundred young men were determined to participate
in the interviews. A body of Chitral Scouts originally stationed in Gilgit to prevent
sectarian tensions was to secure an orderly procedure. When, after hours of waiting,
some applicants expressed their impatience, they were beaten by the Chitral Scouts.
In reaction to this, a man hurled a stone at the scouts, and then the events came thick
and fast: the crowd pushed against the scouts, who opened fire, killing one man and
injuring six others. When news of the incident spread through the town, people
gathered in the streets and shops, and offices were closed in protest. A large crowd
moved toward office buildings, and several were set on fire. Police resorted to tear-
gassing the crowd, and the army was called. A curfew was imposed, and several
politically active persons were arrested. Gilgit had been under curfew many times
before due to sectarian tensions, but this was the first time that a curfew was imposed
because of more politically motivated incidents. Two days later, a large delegation of
persons from the Northern Areas visited the office of the UN Commission for India
and Pakistan (UNCIP) in Islamabad and handed over a memorandum addressed to
the UN secretary-general condemning the attitude of the Government of Pakistan
toward the area and demanding the implementation of the UN Resolution on Kashmir
of August 13, 1948, which had demanded “local self-rule” for the regions affected by
the Kashmir dispute. This memorandum explicitly lamented the “‘colonial’ and
‘apartheid’ policy followed by Pakistani rulers” (for the full text, see Muslim, June 25,
1996).
Compared to the British mode of domination in the Gilgit Agency, the Pakistani
mode exhibits rather the opposite trajectory. The British had to exert effort to establish
a measure of consensus and partial hegemony after they had taken control of the area.
With their experienced skill of “wise” rule, the British achieved their goal remarkably
well and masked their colonial control with a camouflage of cultural adaptation and
distribution of honor, rank, and subsidiary power. The partial “practical hegemony”
achieved by the British was decisively aided by their ability to compare favorably
with the worse colonial practices that had been executed previously by the Kashmiri
18Public employment has for some time been a significant matter of political discontent.
Allegedly most posts, especially those of higher grades, go to “outsiders”—that is, to persons
from the North-West Frontier Province and the Punjab. The issue became even more heated
when in 1985 the salaries of only nonlocal employees were augmented by 25 percent (So¨kefeld
1997b, 299–300).
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administration. Although the colonized population constantly criticized exploitative
practices such as be¯ga¯r and hukmı¯ kha¯rı¯d, available British sources do not present the
picture that such protest ever entailed a challenge to British colonial control as such.
Paradoxically, it seems that these practices were identified as colonial practices only in
retrospect, when, in spite of all the rhetoric of Muslim unity and freedom, these much-
resented practices were continued by the Pakistani administration.
Pakistan’s control of the Gilgit Agency and the Northern Areas, in contrast,
started with a high degree of legitimacy and consensus, but this credit was rapidly
spent and rarely renewed. Consequently, Pakistani power in the area increasingly
depended on (or was replaced by) force. In contrast with the British, the Pakistani
administration did not pay particular attention to local values and customs. Until
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s term, the Pakistani administration never attempted to build a
consensus or secure the legitimacy of its rule in the Northern Areas. Again, under
military rule after 1977, legitimacy was no issue. The legitimacy of Pakistan’s position
in the Northern Areas was simply taken for granted by virtue of a shared Muslim
nationhood and of “national interests” in the context of the Kashmir dispute. In Gilgit,
however, the Pakistani administration was increasingly regarded as foreign domina-
tion. The idea of national self-determination that once motivated the struggle for
independence, partition, and accession to Pakistan was now turned against Pakistan.
Distinguishing between colonialism as structure and colonialism as significa-
tion—that is, between a system of actual rules, institutions, and practices of domi-
nation by a foreign power, on one hand, and its local perception and interpretation,
on the other—we can say that the Pakistani administration from its inception con-
tinued colonialism as structure. The rules of administration in Gilgit were not
changed, and power was not given over to local hands: only the British political agent
was replaced by a Pakistani one. In the beginning, however, this structural continuity
was hardly reflected in signification.19 Pakistani colonialism in the Northern Areas
became a matter of signification only after people in Gilgit understood that Pakistani
control of the area was to be continued by force despite the erosion of consensus and
legitimacy and after the local population started to resent this control strongly—that
is, when colonialism as structure surfaced to an extent that it could not be dissimu-
lated. We can identify the “revolution of Gilgit” as such a turning point. In its
aftermath, both colonialism as signification and colonialism as structure rapidly de-
clined in consequence of the reforms of the Bhutto era. With the abolition of colonial
practices and regulations such as be¯ga¯r, taxation, and the FCR, Pakistani administra-
tion achieved a very high degree of legitimacy and consensus. Matters changed again
during and after the rule of Zia ul Haq. Reforms ended, but at the same time an
unprecedented access to education and dissemination of political knowledge in the
area resulted in an increasing awareness of discriminating political conditions as well
as a heightened ability to identify colonial relations explicitly. Since the beginning
of the 1990s, colonialism as signification is more present in the political (oppositional/
nationalist) discourse than ever before. In this discourse, Pakistan’s legitimacy of rule
in the Northern Areas is almost completely negated, and demands for independence
are raised. This challenge to Pakistani power and control has been answered with
19In this respect, the Pakistani administration was in the beginning similar to that of the
British but was very different from Kashmiri rule of 1947: Ghansar Singh possessed nearly no
actual control over the area, as he lacked all means of force to assert his position and almost
had to dance to the Gilgit Scouts’ tune. Colonialism as structure was nearly absent, whereas
colonialism as signification was at its height.
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021911805002287
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 11 Jul 2017 at 07:44:33, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
964 MARTIN SO¨KEFELD
repressive force, curbing political activities and freedom of expression. Colonialism as
signification engenders colonialism as structure again.
In contemporary nationalist writings, the Pakistani administration of the North-
ern Areas is sometimes compared unfavorably even with the regime of the maharaja
of Kashmir. Some points of this comparison are that, in contrast to the Pakistani
regime, the Kashmiri regime provided for the representation of the then Gilgit
Agency in the state assembly, it enabled access to and right of appeal at the High
Court, the Gilgit Agency possessed full status as a province of Jammu and Kashmir
State, and via the “State Subjects Rule” it prohibited the employment of “foreigners”
in the administration and the purchase of land by “foreigners” (see, for example,
“Manshu¯” n.d., 6).20 Similarly, a pamphlet of the Balawaristan National Front, a
nationalist party, states: “Historically non-Muslim rulers of J&K, Hari Singh gave
Balawaristan [Gilgit Baltistan] a provincial status. He did not get Muslims to fight
among themselves in the name of communalism. He imposed ‘State Subjects Rule’
to protect historic rights of Muslims of J&K and Balawaristan . . . so that aliens may
not infringe on the rights of locals irrespective of religion. Even today, that law is
practiced in J&K, but Pakistani rules have changed our paradise into the colony of
Pathans by breaching State Subjects Rule” (n.d., 2–3).
The nationalist discourse of the Northern Areas offers fundamental dichotomies
of the Northern Areas and Pakistan: Northern Areas/Pakistan, colonized/colonizers,
subaltern/dominant, dependence/power, exploited/exploiters, victims/victimizers, le-
gitimate struggle/illegitimate rule, and self/other. These dichotomies eclipse the pre-
vious unity/identity of both opponents in the name of Islam (thereby replacing
previous oppositions such as Muslims/Hindus) and eradicate difference between cate-
gories. Contrary to the new nationalist vision (and maybe to my narrative of “post-
colonial colonialism” in the Northern Areas), the construction of a singular subject
position (in its dual sense) of “the people” of the Northern Areas vis-a`-vis Pakistan
presupposes the omission of a range of cross-cutting relations. The question of who
the subalterns are in the Northern Areas is not satisfactorily answered as easily as the
nationalist discourse would suggest. There is no clear-cut uniform structural oppo-
sition between the people of the Northern Areas and Pakistan. Relations of “collabo-
ration” (to use that tendentious term) run across the proposed dichotomy. For instance,
many locals are and were of course entangled in the Pakistani administration and in
the military, but the nondichotomous character of colonial relations to which I referred
in the beginning of this article is not reflected in nationalist discourse. The purpose
of nationalist politics of identity is precisely to silence cross-cutting relations and
emphasize the opposition of domination and subordination to enhance the legitimacy
of its own struggle.
Take the example of the Gilgit Scouts. They have, even before the new nationalist
discourse, attained the status of a “national” symbol. To achieve this position, certain
aspects of the scouts’ history had to be obscured. All the “postcolonial” texts referred
to celebrating the actions of the scouts during the freedom struggle—for example,
portraying them as a force of freedom—are characterized by the total eclipse of their
20“Foreigners” in the provision of the State Subjects Rule are all persons not registered as
subjects of Jammu and Kashmir State. This rule is still enforced in today’s (Indian) Jammu
and Kashmir State and in Azad Kashmir but not in the Northern Areas. Accordingly, nonstate
subjects such as those from the Punjab or Pashtun are in a position to buy land and be employed
in the Northern Areas but not in Azad Kashmir. For a brief discussion of the State Subjects
Rule, see So¨kefeld 1997b, 122–23.
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colonial role: their function and instrumentality for British rule (see the texts referred
to in So¨kefeld 1997a; cf. Dani 1989, 312). The scouts seem to have come into being
in summer 1947 only, as if they never had been called to repress opposition and
resistance. The same is true for the role of the scouts under Pakistani command.21 The
scouts’ killing of demonstrators remains mostly an untold story. Perhaps it can be
concluded that the scouts’ achievement of a status as a national symbol was decisively
aided by the abolition of that troop by the Government of Pakistan.22 The example
of the scouts shows that the invention of a tradition may well consist mainly of the
oblivion of a more complete history.
A very marked dichotomization of subalterns and (exploitative) dominants in pre-
1947 times is exhibited by one of the most important local histories of Gilgit, Usman
Ali’s Gilgit kı¯ ro¯g kaha¯nı¯ (The Painful Story of Gilgit). Throughout his writings on
pre-1947 history, Usman Ali constructs a very clear-cut opposition in which the
British, Kashmiri, and local rulers (both before and after Kashmiri intervention) are
equally the exploiters and oppressors of “the people.” In fact, Usman Ali emphasizes
the exploitative role of the local rulers and their relatives (gushpu¯r) who all demanded
their share of taxes and be¯ga¯r, but he does not reflect upon the fact that the officers
of the Gilgit Scouts as well as the most important officer of the Kashmiri Muslim
company (Colonel Hassan Khan), belonged to the same oppressive class. How is it
that they (inadvertently?) were turned into heroes of freedom? Usman Ali offers no
explanation. When he remarks that the “revolutionary passion of the people” who still
felt the “wounds of local raja rule on their bodies” destroyed the aspiration of the rajas
for the restoration of their power (1990, 129), he obviously excludes the insurgent
officers from the aspiration of these rajas. At least some reports about the conflicts in
the weeks following November 1, 1947, however, could well be read as giving hints
that some important persons of the freedom struggle in fact also worked for their
personal empowerment (see the various allegations in Major Brown’s reports in OIOC,
L/P&S/13/1860).
Power/Knowledge in the Northern
Areas of Pakistan
The intimate, double-edged relationship between British colonial power and
knowledge in South Asia is well documented and was in operation also in the Gilgit
Agency. The British mode of domination there, producing a certain consensus of
power, relied heavily on knowledge and surveillance of local conditions.23 The British
strategy of recruiting locals as instruments of power and distributing rank and honor
21This truth extends also to some of the veterans of the freedom struggle. The hero of
freedom, Babar Khan, was at the time of the revolution of Gilgit in 1971 superintendent of
police in the town—that is, an important part of the Pakistani administration. Accordingly,
the freedom was also marked by the insurgency of the people against those who had purportedly
brought them freedom.
22In 1994–95, the former barracks of the Gilgit Scouts in the center of Gilgit Town were
demolished and replaced by a market. Only the “oath hall” has been preserved, the small
building where in 1947 the officers took their oath for the freedom struggle. A plate outside
commemorates this event. By now the scouts have been reduced to a museum item.
23Sometimes, however, British strategies of gathering knowledge in the British agency
were not successful, but rather furthered the production of uncontrollable rumors (So¨kefeld
2002).
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to preempt the opposition of those who might suspect that their own power was to
be annexed and simply replaced by the British required knowing who, according to
local structures and concepts, could be entitled to certain positions. The strategy
required knowing and reconstructing local categories of people so that the right people
were won over by the British. Not everybody in Gilgit was eligible for service in the
Gilgit Scouts. In fact, a considerable part of the population was outright excluded
from accessing that new source of symbolic and material capital. All men belonging
to qo¯m24 regarded locally as “low” and “foreign” (both categories converge to a great
extent)—that is, all those not categorized as kha¯nda¯nı¯ (of a family) (see So¨kefeld 1997b,
97–102; 1998b, 151–56)—could not become scouts. For instance, the Kamin, Dom,
Pashtun, and the different groups of Kashmiri were excluded from recruitment.25 The
scouts of the Gilgit company belonged almost exclusively to the qo¯m Yeshkun, S
.
ı¯n,
and Ro¯no¯ and to the raja family. The British recorded qo¯m membership in census
reports and settlement records. In Gilgit too, then, British rule was directed into an
“idiom of order” (Guha 1997, 24–25), but this order was not exclusively conceived
of as British order but also as local order, which to be maintained required a fair
amount of local knowledge.
Comparable to the British construction of caste in India, the British practice of
categorizing and fixing categories by writing had an important influence on these
categories in Gilgit. Today, people sometimes argue that they belong to a certain
qo¯m because it has been written that they do so (So¨kefeld 1994). Very often the British
practice of recruiting only members of particular qo¯m is quoted today as proof that
these qo¯m were/are indeed of a higher quality than the others. The colonial way of
categorizing thus became integrated into the discourse of “natives.” And here, again,
the British compare favorably with the Pakistani: the Pakistani administration did
not recognize and employ these categories26—that is, Pakistan did not sustain the
“local” order by recognizing important differences, therefore producing disorder. One
almost unanimously resented fact understood locally as an effect of this disorder is
that more and more “people from outside” found their way into the area.27
The relationship here of power and knowledge enters the next stage. The nation-
alist discourse produces a new kind of knowledge that endeavors to reconstruct order,
explain the difference between the Northern Areas and Pakistan, and constitute people
of the Northern Areas as a nation based on common history, culture, language, and
territory (So¨kefeld 1999). This knowledge of the nation is essentializing: it disregards
important differences within what is supposed to be the nation and portrays it as a
timeless essence that existed before colonial intervention and domination in the region
began and that in its core could not be affected by this intervention. Take, as an
example, the following passage from a political pamphlet:
24The term qo¯m has a wide range of meanings, from “kinship-oriented group” to “political
nation” (So¨kefeld 1998a). The groups called “tribes” and “castes” in British sources are locally
called qo¯m.
25One could easily imagine that the Gilgit Scouts Corps would have had a very different
effect on the stabilization of British power in the Gilgit Agency if the British had recruited
mainly these wrong people.
26When the freedom forces had to be enlarged quickly in 1947–48 because of the Kashmir
War, men of other qo¯m were recruited for the first time. Only the very first post-1947 census
of Gilgit still recorded these qo¯m memberships (Government of Azad Kashmir 1951, pt. 2,
sec. B, table 2).
27This opinion can frequently be heard in the discourse of those who claim to be the “real”
people of Gilgit (So¨kefeld 1997b, 1998b).
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For centuries, the Northern Areas [Gilgit Baltistan] had constituted a single unity
in historical, geographical, and political respect. Since the beginning of its history,
this region has been one; whenever sometimes some foreign attacker occupied some
[part of the] region, then the other regions too came under that rule. This is the
reason why the people of these areas have fought together against foreign aggres-
sors. . . . In this manner, the local rulers with their nationalist zeal have preserved
the historical, geographical, political, and cultural identity of the country.28
(“Manshu¯r” n.d., 3–4)
In the nationalist discourse, knowledge becomes subversive, directed against the
dominant power, challenging the legitimacy of its authority. This subversive essen-
tialism poses a danger to Pakistani control, especially when it is enacted publicly.
Thus, the public expression of the oppositional view on the fiftieth anniversary of
Pakistan’s independence in August 1997 was strictly prevented by Pakistani force.
Those writing about the Northern Areas, producing and disseminating knowl-
edge about the region and its people, are entangled in power relations too. This is
obvious in the case of the British colonial authors who could write about the area and
its culture, history, and languages because British control had been extended into the
region. Three of the British authors writing about the Gilgit Agency were political
agents (Biddulph, Durand, and D. L. R. Lorimer) and were themselves representatives
of power. The departure of the British did not sever the entanglement of power and
knowledge. The access to knowledge is still guarded and restricted by power.
The independence of Pakistan has curbed the power of foreigners wishing to enter
the Northern Areas for the purpose of research. They need a permit from the author-
ities. Shortly after I had arrived in Gilgit in summer 1991 for fieldwork, a young man
asked me why and how I had come and whom I had to ask to be allowed to do research
in the town. When I responded that I had to get an official permit from the Govern-
ment of Pakistan, he said: “But you do not research about them, so you should have
asked us!” I was made aware that the relation between power and knowledge had not
yet been decolonized in the Northern Areas. Still, I had to ask some distant, foreign,
and powerful agency that controlled access to that knowledge, not the people about
whom I was to gather information. What I could learn and write about the Northern
Areas was inevitably part of a “game” (or maybe more correctly, “struggle”) of power.
Once I had acquired access by way of having been granted a research permit, I was
also approached by oppositional political activists who wanted to impart to me their
perspective of matters. Tulio Maranhao reminds us that “informants” of research never
just inform the researcher but also try to convince him or her of something (1985,
298). This is even more the case when one is researching politics of identity. Thus,
activists tried to convince me that the people of the Northern Areas constituted a
nation different from that of Pakistan and that this nation was colonized and oppressed
by Pakistan. Although I was certainly sympathetic to the activists’ demands for po-
litical rights, I felt uneasy because they framed this struggle in nationalist terms. As
a German and because of Germany’s special historical experience with nationalism, I
am quite critical of any kind of nationalism, although I understand, rather reluctantly,
that it can be an instrument to a certain degree of liberation from foreign rule.
Besides the views in foreigners’ and nationalists’ writings, there is also what could
be regarded as the “official view” of the matter. Pakistani historian Ahmad Hasan
Dani writes in his History of Northern Areas of Pakistan about the freedom struggle:
28In this passage, Pakistani rule in Gilgit is not mentioned, but later the pamphlet states
that Pakistan has bound the people of the Northern Areas in “inhuman colonial slavery”
(“Manshu¯r” n.d., 5).
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It is the spirit of Jehad that inspired the people of Gilgit and Baltistan and they
enrolled themselves as volunteers to fight along with their men of Gilgit Scouts. The
blood of the martyrs who died in the battlefield, the material and moral support that
the entire people of this Zone gave for [the] fight for freedom and their voluntary
offer to integrate their land with Pakistan, prove the will of the people to cut them-
selves away from the Maharaja and throw away his decision to join with India. Under
this circumstance Northern Areas of Pakistan came into existence to join freely out
of its own accord with Pakistan.
(1989, 401)
This history, written at the request of Zia ul Haq and sponsored by the National
Institute of Historical and Cultural Research (Dani, oral communication, October
1992), celebrates the freedom struggle but gives no hint that the goal of the freedom
fighters—the integration into Pakistan—was never achieved. It is precisely such his-
torical accounts that the nationalist writings attempt to subvert.
How does one write a history of colonialism and postcolonial colonialism in such
a contested field? I definitely do not share the essentialized vision of the Northern
Areas as it is constructed in nationalist discourse. On the other hand, the essentialized
nation cannot altogether be denied because the people of the Northern Areas as a
whole are marked by the essentializing effects of Pakistani domination: they all, ir-
respective of any internal difference, are denied participation in the formation of
Pakistan’s constitutional institutions, including their own administration. This con-
dition, then, impresses a certain degree of polarization upon a historical account even
if it acknowledges that there is no political perspective shared by all and struggles to
remain aware of the range of relations that crosscut these polarities: relations of col-
laboration, of employing foreign power for local purposes, of material gain based on
the colonial political conditions, and so on. A politically conscious history, in my
mind, should not endeavor and cannot achieve a postmodern(ist) deconstruction of all
essentialism, turning all polarities into ambivalence or all difference into hybridity.
Under the universalist, maybe old-fashioned and outdated (but outdated only in the
“theoretically correct” [Frankenberg and Mani 1993, 301] academia of the metropolis,
not in the Northern Areas) premise that all humans should enjoy a degree of equality
in political participation, polarizing historical accounts of the Northern Areas need
to be written as long as polarizing effects of power are at play.
The production of knowledge by writing, accordingly, not only is subjected to
power but also aspires for power or, more modestly, for a change in power relations.
The subalternity that is made known by being written about accuses by nature the
dominant force. Those subalterns who write or speak and reframe/reconstruct their
subalternity in their own terms constitute a danger to the dominant by simply chal-
lenging the dominant group’s representations. “The moment the subaltern has stepped
into the arena of representation and negotiation, this is the first mark of a movement
away from his or her former position. The ability to ‘speak up’ to the hegemonic
forces is a step towards becoming an organic intellectual. However, to become such
a representative is already a movement from the condition that is represented. The
subaltern condition cannot even bear the privilege of its own ‘organic intellectuals’”
(Papastergiadis 1997, 276).29 Producing a nationalist discourse of the Northern Areas
gives a totally new significance to continuing political structures. Therefore, this
discourse, though it is authored only by a minority of the Northern Areas’ population,
29The “real” subalterns, then, cannot write or speak; they are the “other” of discourse,
remaining outside representation (Spivak 1993).
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is regarded with high suspicion and is met with determined repression, if deemed
necessary. The discourse establishes a new power, the nation. Its essentialism is a tool
of empowerment because it enables the recruitment of “the people of the Northern
Areas” into that nation irrespective of whether a person conceives of himself or herself
in these terms. Essentialism here overrides the minority status of a minority discourse
and constructs a new majority.30 Essentialism becomes a matter of strategy (Spivak
1988): it is an instrument in the politics of representation.
Conclusion
In this article, I have discussed aspects of the history of what is today called the
Northern Areas of Pakistan. Starting with the beginning of Kashmiri and British
domination, I have shown how the British shifted their discourse of legitimacy to
distinguish their own mode of domination from that of the Kashmiri. Employing
instruments of domination such as the Gilgit Scouts to co-opt local agency, the Brit-
ish, in contrast with the Kashmiri, were indeed able to develop a partial hegemony.
Although British domination was never really challenged, hegemony was not com-
plete and did not prevent the expression of discontent and moments of resistance.
When the British retreated from the area, the Kashmiri were unable to assume the
position of the British and develop a position of power in Gilgit. The insurrection
against the Kashmiri administration called for accession to Pakistan, but the Northern
Areas remained in the marginal state of a disputed territory. Pakistani rule was in the
beginning characterized by both a high degree of consensus and the continuation of
colonial structures and practices. During the first decades of “independence,” these
practices were only slowly identified by the local population and given the significa-
tion of colonial practices. Opposition to Pakistani domination grew and culminated
in recent years in a nationalist movement demanding independence from Pakistan.
We may distinguish different modes of domination in the history of the Northern
Areas, according to the degree to which violence was employed and consensus was
achieved. A mode of domination depends not only on the strategies executed by those
who dominate but also, in accordance with the Foucauldian concept of power, on the
perception of these strategies by the subaltern population. Thus, colonial domination
is a matter of both certain structures and practices of domination as well as the
signification attributed to these structures and practices. In this respect, Kashmiri
domination was very different from the British colonial system. Later, after 1947,
Pakistan’s rule in the Northern Areas shifted clearly from a rule of freedom to a new
colonialism in local discourse and perception. The relationship of structure and sig-
nification in modes of domination reflects certain conditions of power and knowledge.
British knowledge of local circumstances in particular enabled them to develop strat-
30This discursive construction of a majority also creates new minorities, namely, those that
are excluded by the nationalist vision or who exclude themselves. In Gilgit there is a group
of people who are called Kashmiri and regarded as a “lower” qo¯m. There are significantly fewer
adherents to the new nationalism among these Kashmiri than there are among other qo¯m.
This may be because the Pakistani administration ended the discrimination against the Kash-
miri groups—for example, by recruiting them into the Azad Forces. On “Pakistan Day” (Au-
gust 14), there has been in the last few years much richer and more festive decoration in the
Kashmiri parts of Gilgit’s bazaar than in bazaar areas dominated by other groups. I owe this
information to Katrin Gratz.
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egies of power that resulted in partial hegemony and allowed them to reduce the
execution of force to a minimum. The emerging picture, then, is quite complex and
does not allow in every case for an easy and clear-cut distinction between those who
wielded power and those who were subjected to that power. The effectiveness of the
British system seemed to be based precisely on the British endeavor to blur a definite
distinction to a certain extent and to prevent the emergence of a consciousness of a
clear contrast and opposition between British colonizers and the local colonized. This
is very different from the recent political situation in Gilgit: the nationalist movement
produces a kind of knowledge that emphasizes the difference between locals and the
Pakistani administration, thereby promoting the recognition of that administration
as a colonial system.
Taken literally, the title of my article is a paradox. This contradiction is the central
subject of postcolonial studies: colonialism did not simply end with independence.
The contradiction echoes the difficulties of the term “postcolonial.” Pakistan is of
course a postcolonial state, but this postcoloniality acquires very different meanings
depending on different perspectives within the country. This difference emerges not
only in the political discourse of the Northern Areas but also in those of other move-
ments alleging the discrimination of peripheral regions by the powerful center. That
a state is “postcolonial” in a certain set of political relations does not preclude its
colonial character in another set. The contradiction then describes appropriately the
political circumstances found today in the Northern Areas of Pakistan. Some kind of
colonialism has ended, but some other kind, originating from the end of the first, is
still working, engendering an anticolonial struggle, similar to that against British
rule in that it too is framed in nationalist terms—only that the meaning of “nation”
has changed and the anticolonial struggle before 1947 did not take place in the Gilgit
Agency. The paradox of postcolonial colonialism, then, strongly reminds us of the
fact that the meaning of history is not a matter of either/or logics, but of ambivalence
and multivocality inscribed onto a range of conflicting subject positions and a struggle
over signification.
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